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.Dd February 6, 2017
.Dt IPSEC 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ipsec
.Nd Internet Protocol Security protocol
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Cd "options IPSEC"
.Cd "options IPSEC_SUPPORT"
.Cd "device crypto"
.Pp
.In sys/types.h
.In netinet/in.h
.In netipsec/ipsec.h
.In netipsec/ipsec6.h
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a security protocol implemented within the Internet Protocol layer
of the networking stack.
.Nm
is defined for both IPv4 and IPv6
.Xr ( inet 4
and
.Xr inet6 4 ) .
.Nm
is a set of protocols,
.Tn ESP
(for Encapsulating Security Payload)
.Tn AH
(for Authentication Header),
and
.Tn IPComp
(for IP Payload Compression Protocol)
that provide security services for IP datagrams.
AH both authenticates and guarantees the integrity of an IP packet
by attaching a cryptographic checksum computed using one-way hash functions.
ESP, in addition, prevents unauthorized parties from reading the payload of
an IP packet by also encrypting it.
IPComp tries to increase communication performance by compressing IP payload,
thus reducing the amount of data sent.
This will help nodes on slow links but with enough computing power.
.Nm
operates in one of two modes: transport mode or tunnel mode.
Transport mode is used to protect peer-to-peer communication between end nodes.
Tunnel mode encapsulates IP packets within other IP packets
and is designed for security gateways such as VPN endpoints.
.Pp
System configuration requires the
.Xr crypto 4
subsystem.
.Pp
The packets can be passed to a virtual
.Xr enc 4
interface,
to perform packet filtering before outbound encryption and after decapsulation
inbound.
.Pp
To properly filter on the inner packets of an
.Nm
tunnel with firewalls, you can change the values of the following sysctls
.Bl -column net.inet6.ipsec6.filtertunnel default enable
.It Sy "Name	Default	Enable"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.filtertunnel	0	1"
.It "net.inet6.ipsec6.filtertunnel	0	1"
.El
.\"
.Ss Kernel interface
.Nm
is controlled by a key management and policy engine,
that reside in the operating system kernel.
Key management
is the process of associating keys with security associations, also
know as SAs.
Policy management dictates when new security
associations created or destroyed.
.Pp
The key management engine can be accessed from userland by using
.Dv PF_KEY
sockets.
The
.Dv PF_KEY
socket API is defined in RFC2367.
.Pp
The policy engine is controlled by an extension to the
.Dv PF_KEY
API,
.Xr setsockopt 2
operations, and
.Xr sysctl 3
interface.
The kernel implements
an extended version of the
.Dv PF_KEY
interface and allows the programmer to define IPsec policies
which are similar to the per-packet filters.
The
.Xr setsockopt 2
interface is used to define per-socket behavior, and
.Xr sysctl 3
interface is used to define host-wide default behavior.
.Pp
The kernel code does not implement a dynamic encryption key exchange protocol
such as IKE
(Internet Key Exchange).
Key exchange protocols are beyond what is necessary in the kernel and
should be implemented as daemon processes which call the
.Nm APIs.
.\"
.Ss Policy management
IPsec policies can be managed in one of two ways, either by
configuring per-socket policies using the
.Xr setsockopt 2
system calls, or by configuring kernel level packet filter-based
policies using the
.Dv PF_KEY
interface, via the
.Xr setkey 8
you can define IPsec policies against packets using rules similar to packet
filtering rules.
Refer to
.Xr setkey 8
on how to use it.
.Pp
Depending on the socket's address family, IPPROTO_IP or IPPROTO_IPV6
transport level and IP_IPSEC_POLICY or IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options
may be used to configure per-socket security policies.
A properly-formed IPsec policy specification structure can be
created using
.Xr ipsec_set_policy 3
function and used as socket option value for the
.Xr setsockopt 2
call.
.Pp
When setting policies using the
.Xr setkey 8
command, the
.Dq Li default
option instructs the system to use its default policy, as
explained below, for processing packets.
The following sysctl variables are available for configuring the
system's IPsec behavior.
The variables can have one of two values.
A
.Li 1
means
.Dq Li use ,
which means that if there is a security association then use it but if
there is not then the packets are not processed by IPsec.
The value
.Li 2
is synonymous with
.Dq Li require ,
which requires that a security association must exist for the packets
to move, and not be dropped.
These terms are defined in
.Xr ipsec_set_policy 3 .
.Bl -column net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_trans_deflev integerxxx
.It Sy "Name	Type	Changeable"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.esp_trans_deflev	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.esp_net_deflev	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.ah_trans_deflev	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.ah_net_deflev	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_trans_deflev	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_net_deflev	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet6.ipsec6.ah_trans_deflev	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet6.ipsec6.ah_net_deflev	integer	yes"
.El
.Pp
If the kernel does not find a matching, system wide, policy then the
default value is applied.
The system wide default policy is specified
by the following
.Xr sysctl 8
variables.
.Li 0
means
.Dq Li discard
which asks the kernel to drop the packet.
.Li 1
means
.Dq Li none .
.Bl -column net.inet6.ipsec6.def_policy integerxxx
.It Sy "Name	Type	Changeable"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.def_policy	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet6.ipsec6.def_policy	integer	yes"
.El
.\"
.Ss Miscellaneous sysctl variables
When the
.Nm
protocols are configured for use, all protocols are included in the system.
To selectively enable/disable protocols, use
.Xr sysctl 8 .
.Bl -column net.inet.ipcomp.ipcomp_enable
.It Sy "Name	Default"
.It "net.inet.esp.esp_enable	On"
.It "net.inet.ah.ah_enable	On"
.It "net.inet.ipcomp.ipcomp_enable	On"
.El
.Pp
In addition the following variables are accessible via
.Xr sysctl 8 ,
for tweaking the kernel's IPsec behavior:
.Bl -column net.inet6.ipsec6.inbonud_call_ike integerxxx
.It Sy "Name	Type	Changeable"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.ah_cleartos	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.ah_offsetmask	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.dfbit	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.ecn	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.debug	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.natt_cksum_policy	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet.ipsec.check_policy_history	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet6.ipsec6.ecn	integer	yes"
.It "net.inet6.ipsec6.debug	integer	yes"
.El
.Pp
The variables are interpreted as follows:
.Bl -tag -width 6n
.It Li ipsec.ah_cleartos
If set to non-zero, the kernel clears the type-of-service field in the IPv4 header
during AH authentication data computation.
This variable is used to get current systems to inter-operate with devices that
implement RFC1826 AH.
It should be set to non-zero
(clear the type-of-service field)
for RFC2402 conformance.
.It Li ipsec.ah_offsetmask
During AH authentication data computation, the kernel will include a
16bit fragment offset field
(including flag bits)
in the IPv4 header, after computing logical AND with the variable.
The variable is used for inter-operating with devices that
implement RFC1826 AH.
It should be set to zero
(clear the fragment offset field during computation)
for RFC2402 conformance.
.It Li ipsec.dfbit
This variable configures the kernel behavior on IPv4 IPsec tunnel encapsulation.
If set to 0, the DF bit on the outer IPv4 header will be cleared while
1 means that the outer DF bit is set regardless from the inner DF bit and
2 indicates that the DF bit is copied from the inner header to the
outer one.
The variable is supplied to conform to RFC2401 chapter 6.1.
.It Li ipsec.ecn
If set to non-zero, IPv4 IPsec tunnel encapsulation/decapsulation behavior will
be friendly to ECN
(explicit congestion notification),
as documented in
.Li draft-ietf-ipsec-ecn-02.txt .
.Xr gif 4
talks more about the behavior.
.It Li ipsec.debug
If set to non-zero, debug messages will be generated via
.Xr syslog 3 .
.It Li ipsec.natt_cksum_policy
Controls how the kernel handles TCP and UDP checksums when ESP in UDP
encapsulation is used for IPsec transport mode.
If set to a non-zero value, the kernel fully recomputes checksums for
inbound TCP segments and UDP datagrams after they are decapsulated and
decrypted.
If set to 0 and original addresses were configured for corresponding SA
by the IKE daemon, the kernel incrementally recomputes checksums for
inbound TCP segments and UDP datagrams.
If addresses were not configured, the checksums are ignored.
.It Li ipsec.check_policy_history
Enables strict policy checking for inbound packets.
By default, inbound security policies check that packets handled by IPsec
have been decrypted and authenticated.
If this variable is set to a non-zero value, each packet handled by IPsec
is checked against the history of IPsec security associations.
The IPsec security protocol, mode, and SA addresses must match.
.El
.Pp
Variables under the
.Li net.inet6.ipsec6
tree have similar meanings to those described above.
.\"
.Sh PROTOCOLS
The
.Nm
protocol acts as a plug-in to the
.Xr inet 4
and
.Xr inet6 4
protocols and therefore supports most of the protocols defined upon
those IP-layer protocols.
The
.Xr icmp 4
and
.Xr icmp6 4
protocols may behave differently with
.Nm
because
.Nm
can prevent
.Xr icmp 4
or
.Xr icmp6 4
routines from looking into the IP payload.
.\"
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ioctl 2 ,
.Xr socket 2 ,
.Xr ipsec_set_policy 3 ,
.Xr crypto 4 ,
.Xr enc 4 ,
.Xr icmp6 4 ,
.Xr if_ipsec 4 ,
.Xr intro 4 ,
.Xr ip6 4 ,
.Xr setkey 8 ,
.Xr sysctl 8
.\".Xr racoon 8
.Rs
.%A "S. Kent"
.%A "R. Atkinson"
.%T "IP Authentication Header"
.%O "RFC 2404"
.Re
.Rs
.%A "S. Kent"
.%A "R. Atkinson"
.%T "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"
.%O "RFC 2406"
.Re
.Sh STANDARDS
.Rs
.%A Daniel L. McDonald
.%A Craig Metz
.%A Bao G. Phan
.%T "PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2"
.%R RFC
.%N 2367
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A "D. L. McDonald"
.%T "A Simple IP Security API Extension to BSD Sockets"
.%R internet draft
.%N "draft-mcdonald-simple-ipsec-api-03.txt"
.%O work in progress material
.Re
.Sh HISTORY
The original
.Nm
implementation appeared in the WIDE/KAME IPv6/IPsec stack.
.Pp
For
.Fx 5.0
a fully locked IPsec implementation called fast_ipsec was brought in.
The protocols drew heavily on the
.Ox
implementation of the
.Tn IPsec
protocols.
The policy management code was derived from the
.Tn KAME
implementation found
in their
.Tn IPsec
protocols.
The fast_ipsec implementation lacked
.Xr ip6 4
support but made use of the
.Xr crypto 4
subsystem.
.Pp
For
.Fx 7.0
.Xr ip6 4
support was added to fast_ipsec.
After this the old KAME IPsec implementation was dropped and fast_ipsec
became what now is the only
.Nm
implementation in
.Fx .
.Sh BUGS
There is no single standard for the policy engine API,
so the policy engine API described herein is just for this implementation.
.Pp
AH and tunnel mode encapsulation may not work as you might expect.
If you configure inbound
.Dq require
policy with an AH tunnel or any IPsec encapsulating policy with AH
(like
.Dq Li esp/tunnel/A-B/use ah/transport/A-B/require ) ,
tunnelled packets will be rejected.
This is because the policy check is enforced on the inner packet on reception,
and AH authenticates encapsulating
(outer)
packet, not the encapsulated
(inner)
packet
(so for the receiving kernel there is no sign of authenticity).
The issue will be solved when we revamp our policy engine to keep all the
packet decapsulation history.
.Pp
When a large database of security associations or policies is present
in the kernel the
.Dv SADB_DUMP
and
.Dv SADB_SPDDUMP
operations on
.Dv PF_KEY
sockets may fail due to lack of space.
Increasing the socket buffer
size may alleviate this problem.
.Pp
The
.Tn IPcomp
protocol may occasionally error because of
.Xr zlib 3
problems.
.Pp
This documentation needs more review.