-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-12:06.bind Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Multiple Denial of Service vulnerabilities with named(8) Category: contrib Module: bind Announced: 2012-11-22 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD before 9.1-RC2. Corrected: 2012-11-22 23:15:38 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.4-STABLE) 2012-11-22 22:52:15 UTC (RELENG_7_4, 7.4-RELEASE-p11) 2012-10-11 13:25:09 UTC (RELENG_8, 8.3-STABLE) 2012-11-22 22:52:15 UTC (RELENG_8_3, 8.3-RELEASE-p5) 2012-10-10 19:50:15 UTC (RELENG_9, 9.1-PRERELEASE) 2012-11-22 22:52:15 UTC (RELENG_9_0, 9.0-RELEASE-p5) 2012-11-22 22:52:15 UTC (RELENG_9_1, 9.1-RC1-p1) 2012-11-22 22:52:15 UTC (RELENG_9_1, 9.1-RC2-p1) 2012-11-22 22:52:15 UTC (RELENG_9_1, 9.1-RC3-p1) CVE Name: CVE-2012-4244, CVE-2012-5166 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols. The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server. II. Problem Description The BIND daemon would crash when a query is made on a resource record with RDATA that exceeds 65535 bytes. The BIND daemon would lock up when a query is made on specific combinations of RDATA. III. Impact A remote attacker can query a resolving name server to retrieve a record whose RDATA is known to be larger than 65535 bytes, thereby causing the resolving server to crash via an assertion failure in named. An attacker who is in a position to add a record with RDATA larger than 65535 bytes to an authoritative name server can cause that server to crash by later querying for that record. The attacker can also cause the server to lock up with specific combinations of RDATA. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems not running the BIND name server are not affected. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE, 8-STABLE, or 9-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_4, RELENG_8_3, or RELENG_9_0 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.4, 8.3, and 9.0 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:06/bind.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:06/bind.patch.asc b) Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 8.3-RELEASE, 9.0-RELEASE, or 9.1-RC1 on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install 4) Install and run BIND from the Ports Collection after the correction date. The following versions and newer versions of BIND installed from the Ports Collection are not affected by this vulnerability: bind96-9.6.3.1.ESV.R7.4 bind97-9.7.6.4 bind98-9.8.3.4 bind99-9.9.1.4 VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/7/ r243418 releng/7.4/ r243417 stable/8/ r241443 releng/8.3/ r243417 stable/9/ r241415 releng/9.0/ r243417 releng/9.1/ r243417 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00778 https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00801 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-4244 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-5166 The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-12:06.bind.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 iEYEARECAAYFAlCutVIACgkQFdaIBMps37JhPQCfcwCHE7CxzBnrMdszdFYODgQs 1+kAn316Rx2d0Ecig5JHUR3broq5Hpog =EklC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----